Chen Taiyi, Zhang Yueyi and Song Mingshun
(School of Economics and Management, China Ji Liang University)
Abstract: Information asymmetry between the supply and demand sides in the food market affects food safety’s allocation efficiency. In this paper, based on the different functions of the public, the media, the food companies and the government in food safety control activities, the food safety information spreading and regulatory administration is divided into two distinct but mutually interacting parts: the internal information coordination and the external regulation. As for the internal information coordination part, a dynamic game model on the food safety information coordination and quality improving among the public, the media and the food companies is established. The model’s equilibriums and their influencing factors are analyzed, and the social conditions required for the best food safety allocation efficiency are found. The government plays his role as an external regulator by making macro-controls of the internal information coordination’s equilibrium-influencing factors. The result shows that effective incentive “mechanism for information report, incentive mechanism for media coverage and incentive mechanism for quality improving” are essential for promoting efficient use of food safety information in the whole society and making quality improvement for food safety. Meanwhile, in order to prevent the governmental regulation failures on food safety control, the food safety achievements should be included in the governmental performance evaluation systems, the rigid administrative accountability mechanisms should be constructed, and the anti-corruption mechanisms and anti-corruption force be strengthen. Besides, non-governmental organizations involved in food safety management should be encouraged to play more of their supervision roles.
Key Words: Food Safety; Information Asymmetry; Media Coverage; Sequential Game; Incentive Mechanism